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Abstract
This paper examines the implementation of competitive tendering in the Scottish
National Health Service. Data relating to cleaning, catering and laundering services--
the three services targeted for competitive tendering--are examined. Our analysis
suggests that for the first four years the request to market test was largely ignored in
Scotland. In 1987 it become a management requirement, and within three years of its
fresh start implementation of this policy more than matched the corresponding
experience in England.3
Competitive tendering in the Scottish National Health Service
Was it compulsory, and did it make a difference?(*)
1. Introduction
It was commonplace in the 1970s for support services in the public sector to be
provided "in house" by direct service organisations. The arrival of successive
Conservative governments, initially under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher,
decided it would be appropriate to test the efficient provision of these support services.
A distinctive feature of this process was that support services were put out to
competitive tender. The economic motivation was that subjecting these activities to
competition should result in services being delivered at lower cost thereby (in theory)
release resources for other purposes.  Early starts were made in local and central
government.  Legislative measures were used for local government,  first in 1980 and
then 1988, and the expression ‘compulsory competitive tendering’ (emphasis added)
became common parlance.  Implementation in central government had a much lower
public profile.
This paper looks at the experience of competitive tendering in the National
Health Service [NHS], and particularly what happened in Scotland.  The focus, in
Scotland as throughout the rest of the United Kingdom, was on cleaning, catering and
laundering services.  Health boards (and authorities) were also encouraged to include
others services, though none were identified by name in the initial guidance.  In this
paper Scotland’s experience is compared to that of England (and to a lesser extent to
Northern Ireland and Wales). More specifically, the aim is to answer two related
questions. The first is: Was competitive tendering in practice ‘compulsory’, even
though it never had statutory force?  The second is: Was competitive tendering4
successful in terms of coverage and costs saved? Our analysis suggests that for the first
four years competitive tendering was not compulsory. Only in 1987 did it effectively
become so, and within three years of its fresh start the policy more than matched the
corresponding experience in England.
2. From “Ask” to “Require”
This section addresses the issue of ‘compulsion’.  In fact we are not aware that
the word ‘compulsion’ has ever been used in official guidance issued to health boards
and authorities by the central government Health Departments.  At first boards were
‘asked’, like their English authority counterparts,  to follow the guidance by their
respective Health Departments (SHHD, 1983).  The strongest statement to be found in
the Scottish guidance was: “There is a special obligation on Boards … where service
costs are significantly above average …” (Ibid para 5). As we show below, the
Scottish boards responded rather differently to the initial request than did their English
counterparts.  Later the boards were ‘required’ to follow the guidance.
Information on expenditure on the three hotel services in the financial year
1984-85, by health board, is given in table 1. As this table shows, expenditure in
Scotland (as a whole) was considerably higher than in any single English Regional
Health Authority [RHA] that year, varying from £15m to £45m for domestic services;
£13m to £37m for catering; and £3m to £6m for laundry (Social Services Committee,
1986, table 7.1). The overall total of £131m represented 7.7% of total current
expenditure on the Scottish NHS in that year.
<<<< Table 1 About Here >>>>
No invitations to tender were issued by the health boards in Scotland in the first
six months of 1983. The National Audit Office identified a number of difficulties5
(NAO, 1987, part 4).  First, the number of private contractors capable of delivering the
required services was limited.  This was particularly the case of laundries, of which
there were only nine in Scotland with a combined spare capacity of less than one per
cent of NHS work.  Significantly, the National Audit Office indicated that “boards
were accordingly required to tender only where there was sufficient capacity”
(emphases added).  Second, there was strong opposition, particularly from  the trades
unions.  And third, the National Audit Office referred to “pressures from structural
reorganisation” within the health boards.  The report did not spell out what these were.
Levitt et al (1995, p 101) suggest there had been a delay in implementation of
reorganisation in Scotland (SHHD, 1979).  This had been planned for 1 April 1982,
but “took much longer”.
In response to these difficulties, further guidance was issued by the Department
in June 1984, which set out a short and a long-term programme for health boards
(SHHD, 1984). In the short term, by the end of March 1985, each health board was
required to put out to tender the domestic and catering services for their head office
and at least two hospitals. In the longer term, the boards are “asked” to draw up a
programme showing when, during the three year period to the end March 1988, the
remaining domestic, catering and laundry services would be reviewed and put out to
tender. The three Islands health boards of Orkney, Shetland and the Western Isles were
exempt, but were expected to make efficiency savings by other means.
In August 1984 Fife Health Board, followed by Greater Glasgow, Lothian,
Highland, and Argyll and Clyde Health Boards, announced they would not put these
services out to tender. Instead they would seek to make savings through “joint
management/union efficiency reviews” (NAO, 1987, para 4.5). The five health boards
accounted for some 55% of expenditure on these three services in Scotland (see table6
1 above). In July 1985 the Minister for Health and Social Work indicated that health
boards not taking the route of market testing would be set cost savings targets in the
financial year 1985-86 of 10% of their expenditure on the three services in 1984-85. In
October 1986 the Department again wrote to health boards reminding them of the
April 1988 deadline for putting all their support services out to tender (NAO, 1987,
para. 4.20). (The three Islands health boards continued to be exempt).
Some idea of the different path the Scottish NHS took can be gained from the
National Audit Office evaluation at the end of September 1986. End September was
the date when the English health authorities were expected to have fully completed
their programme of tendering (NAO, 1987, para 4.8). In England, 43% of support
services by value had been awarded. The corresponding proportions for Wales and
Scotland were much lower at 8% and 2%, respectively (NAO, 1987, paras 4.8 and
5.5). The lower proportions for Wales and Scotland have several possible
interpretations. One commonly mentioned is spatial: for example, there is a
North/South divide in Britain. Alternatively, there is a centre/periphery contrast, with
London and the South East of England representing the centre and the North of
England, Scotland, Wales [and Northern Ireland] representing the periphery context.
Neither explanation stands up to the evidence given below.
Information on implementation by English RHA at the end of September 1986,
in respect of value of services by invitations to tender, is given in figure 1.  The overall
value for invitations to tender for all services and all RHAs at this date is 68%, and
corresponds to the estimate of 48%, cited above, for value for contracts awarded. The
fifteen RHAs are placed into five groups based on  geographic proximity, and in turn
are ordered in terms of their distance from London, with group 1 being closest to
London and group 5 being farthest distant. If distance mattered, one might expect7
implementation to be highest in group 1 and lowest in group 5. This is not the case. If
any systematic variation can be traced, and it is clearest for laundry services, the
proportion was higher the farther the distance from London. It is important to point
out that Scotland, in this respect, was not the only outlier--it is also the case for
Northern Ireland. As late as July 1988, only 3.9% by value had been submitted for
tendering (NI, DHSS, 1988).
<<<< Figure 1 About Here >>>>
The virtual absence of tendering in Scotland did not last much longer. The
National Audit Report, published in April 1987, was explicit in its comparison between
Scotland, England and Wales. In June 1987, a Conservative government was re-
elected, and Michael Forsyth was appointed a Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the
Scottish Office with responsibility for Scottish education and health. Forsyth was
already well known as an advocate of privatisation. Margaret Thatcher was later to
describe him as “[T]he real powerhouse of Thatcherism in the Scottish Office…”
(Thatcher, 1993 p 620).  Forsyth seems to have been given a free hand, right from the
start, to ensure competitive tendering was introduced throughout the Scottish NHS.
He “inaugurated” a meeting, held on 2 October, between health board chairmen and
managers and representatives of the trade associations for contract cleaners and
caterers, and Grant Thorton Management Consultants. The latter group of contractors
and the firm of management consultants all had experience of market testing in the
English NHS.
Contractors had become seriously interested in the Scottish market by this
time. One reason being that most of the first round of tendering in England had been
completed and few contracts were due for renewal. Contract cleaners would have been
particularly interested; with one exception, contract caterers were much less so (Milne,8
1993 and 1997). In addition (as noted above), the Scottish market was larger than any
English RHA and offered contractors the prospect of significant additional new
business.
The October meeting was followed by an official letter from the Home and
Health Department of 11 December 1987 to the health boards (SHHD, undated).  The
Minister was described as “very concerned”, and health boards were to seek tenders
for blocks of domestic and blocks of catering contracts and have them let by end April
1988: being at least two blocks of domestic and two blocks of catering services for
each of the health boards. Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, Highland and each of the
three Islands Health Boards were excepted, and each was given targets of at least one
block of domestic and one block of catering services.  In total, a minimum of 24 blocks
of domestic and 24 blocks of catering contracts were to be let by end April 1988.
Laundry services were explicitly excluded from the requirement to be put out to tender
unless new facilities were to be brought into operation.  Determined as the 1987
guidance was, the immediate targets for April 1988  would have covered only a
modest proportion of all NHS hospitals, even for domestic and catering services.
By 27 February 1988 Forsyth felt able to announce on Radio Scotland that all
health boards had agreed to invite tenders for in-house services. One wonders what
Forsyth had in mind, when stating: “No additional powers are required in this area”,
had he felt unable to make such an announcement (Hansard, 25 May 1988 written
answer col. 184).  As one senior servant has recently written:
“I think that there can be no doubt, in particular in the wake of the 1987
guidance, that Health Boards were clear as to what was expected of them.
And for those few that questioned the force of the guidance, it was also
made quite clear that if they felt that they could opt not to apply the
guidance, then that guidance could very rapidly [be] turned into a direction
and that their choice would thereby be removed from them.”9
The effect of the 1987 Forsyth initiative was dramatic. The number of new domestic
services contracts increased from 3 in 1987, to 20, 60, 23 and 13 in the next four years
(Milne, 1993, table 1). The corresponding data for catering were 3, 9, 47, 17 and 10
contracts.  Health boards may not have responded as quickly as the Minister had
indicated in December 1987, but  over the longer term they far exceeded the immediate
targets set.
3. Did Competitive Tendering Work?
  3.1 Evaluation Methods
In this section, the "Forsyth initiative" is evaluated in the same terms as used by
the National Audit Office, with the main criteria being "coverage" and "costs saved".
Comparisons are made to England in the first three years of the implementation (i.e. to
the end of September 1986). A similar three-year period is  used for Scotland (i.e. to
the end of March 1991). The services covered by central government guidance are: (1)
domestic, (2) catering and (3) laundry/linen. The premises covered are hospitals, and
other NHS premises such as clinics, health centres and health board offices. In this
evaluation the experience of contracting is restricted to hospitals, and more particularly
to the 273 hospitals identified in the annual publication Scottish Health Service Costs
as open and with some staffed beds for all five financial years 1986-87 to 1990-91.
 3.2 Coverage
It is not possible to replicate the National Audit Office report exactly, and this
should be borne in mind when considering Scottish/English comparisons. Three
qualifications are worth noting. First, the estimates are for hospital contracts. This is
not a serious qualification.  First, the focus of the 1987 initiative was to put out to
competitive tender hospital domestic and catering services.  Second, hospital contracts10
have tended to be much larger, by far (Milne, 1993, table 2), and account for the
overwhelming proportion of NHS expenditure on domestic and catering services.  And
finally, once the policy of tendering for hospital services has been accepted by a health
board, it is a small step to include other premises such of offices, health centres and
clinics. This extension was particularly evident for domestic services, as one might
expect, and they accounted for the overwhelming proportion of contracts for non-
hospital NHS premises. In the cases of catering and laundry services, competitive
tending for non-hospital premises was hardly an issue since these services were rarely
provided or only on a very modest basis.
Second, coverage is measured in terms of staffed beds available, not cleaning
or catering costs. In the period to the financial year 1990-91 published information on
hospital hotel service costs was only available for the larger hospitals. However, there
is some evidence that unit cleaning costs were much the same for hospitals of different
sizes. This being the case, information on staffed beds available would be an adequate
substitute for costs to measure the coverage of competitive tendering for domestic
services, and possibly for catering as well.
Third, the contracts are identified in terms of their start date. We do not have
information on the dates invitations to tender were issued or when the contracts were
awarded. Of the three qualifications this is the most serious by far. As noted above, in
England coverage in terms of invitations to tender by the end of September 1986 was
68%, but only 48% in terms of contracts awarded. Coverage in terms of start date
would be even smaller, though it is difficult to establish by how much.
Information on the number of hospital domestic and catering contacts and the
extent of their coverage by end of the financial year 1990-1 is given in table 2. The
table includes one (catering only) contract put out to tender for which no award was11
made. The discrepancy between the number of contracts indicated in the table and
those cited in the text above comes from the inclusion (in the text) of contracts for
non-hospital premises, particularly notable in the case of domestic services. The much
larger number of hospitals compared to the number of contracts is because often
contracts were not for a single hospital. One extreme example is the health board that
put all but one of its hospitals out to tender in a single catering contract. Notice also
that the proportion of beds covered was much greater than the proportion of hospitals,
and would have been the consequence of directing competitive tendering at the larger
hospitals.
<<<< Table 2 About Here >>>>
It is important to note the pace at which coverage was achieved in Scotland.
By the end of March 1991, slightly more than three years after the Forsyth initiative,
coverage exceeded 80% of beds for domestic and catering services in terms of the start
date of contracts. The corresponding proportions of invitations to tender for England,
by the end of September 1986 (and three years after the publication of official
guidance) is similar for domestic services, but very much lower for catering, being only
about 50%.
The situation could have hardly been more different for laundry services.
Existing provision was exempt from the Forsyth initiative, and by the end of March
1991 only one board wide contract and two part board laundry contracts had started.
In England 80% of laundry services had been put out to tender by end September
1986. No further reference will be made to laundry services.
3.3 Costs Saved12
In this section we focus on some of the characteristics that may have a bearing
on the costs saved. The costs saved was the main economic measure of the policy’s
success (or failure) at that time.  The 1983 Health Departments’ circulars were written
in terms of testing the “cost-effectiveness” of domestic, catering and laundry services.
Nevertheless, health boards and  authorities were expected to award contracts to the
lowest tender, bearing in mind that those invited to tender had previously been vetted
for their financial viability and technical competence.  Further, the policy of
competitive tendering was seen as one arm of the ‘efficiency savings’ programme
current at that time, aimed at providing additional patient care without drawing on the
Exchequer.  Finally, previous experience of significant cost saving achieved from
competitive tendering in the Ministry of Defence would not have gone unnoticed (Hall,
1984). Estimates are therefore made of the costs saved for the same set of 273
hospitals over the financial years from 1986-87 to 1990-91 inclusive.
The contract characteristics considered are: type of service, that is single
service or mixed services; value of the contract put out to tender; and who won the
contract.  Of the 84 contracts with domestic services, 59 were domestic only contracts
and 25 included one or more other services as well. Of the 76 contracts with catering
services, 55 were catering only and 21 included one or more other services. A
distinctive feature of the 21 mixed catering contracts is that they all included domestics
services. This considerable overlap between the mixed domestic and mixed catering
contracts is the result of the distinctively Scottish practice at that time of putting hotel
service contracts out to tender. We therefore exclude the mixed service contracts when
differentiating domestic from catering contracts, and largely limit comparisons to the
59 domestic only and the 55 catering only contracts.13
Information is given in table 3 on values of contract in terms of pre-tender cost.
Separate distributions are given for the single service domestic and catering contracts
and the mixed domestic contracts. All indicate a wide variation in value.
<<<< Table 3 About Here  >>>>
Originally hospital domestic and catering services were provided in Scotland by
direct service organisations [DSOs]. Usually the DSOs retained the contracts. Those
lost to contractors were a distinctive group, mostly for single service domestic
contracts. DSOs won 69 of the 84 domestic contracts, the 15 contracts won by
contractors were only for single services. Contractors won none of the 25 mixed
domestic contracts. Contractors won three catering contracts, all in the largest group
by value. Catering contractors, of course, won none of the mixed catering contracts.
Contractors’ experience in Scotland thus matched the English experience which had
preceded it, both in terms of service and contract size. The complete failure of
contractors to win hotel service contracts should however be noted.
Cost saving is defined as the difference between the tender price and the
previous cost, both expressed in annual terms and in current prices. This is the method
used by the National Audit Office. Information is given in table 4 on the costs saved,
so defined, for single domestic, single catering and mixed domestic contracts. All three
groups indicate a large variation. For all but three contracts, tendering resulted in a
drop in expenditure measured in current prices. The drop in real terms - that is,
adjusted for changes in the price level - would have been larger still.
<<<< Table 4 About Here >>>>
Two approaches are used in this paper to estimate the magnitude of cost
savings. The first uses the approach we believe was followed by the National Audit
Office. This method gives each £1 of saving equal weight. Using this method, the14
saving for all relevant contracts is aggregated and then compared with the aggregate of
the corresponding pre-contract values. On this basis, the cost saving in Scotland for
single domestic, single catering and mixed domestic services were 23%, 15% and 14%.
The preceding English experience concentrated on single service contracts, and
the corresponding proportions for domestic and catering services were 26% and 10%,
respectively (NAO, 1987, table 4). Bearing in mind that health boards already had
efficiency savings equivalent to 10% of hotel costs imposed in the financial year 1985-
86, and that the coverage of catering was much more extensive in Scotland, the
savings achieved were greater in Scotland.
The second approach recognises the large variation in costs saved, and that this
variation may be due to systematic as well as to random effects. To test this possibility
we give each contract equal weight, with small contracts having the same weight as
large ones. The domestic and catering service contracts are then divided into sixteen
possible sub-sets, two sub-sets each for winner, contract size, service and service type.
Pairs of these sub-sets are then compared to test whether differences in costs saved
were unlikely to have come by chance. Data for the various sub-sets are given in the
Appendix 1. Here we simply report the results where observed differences in costs
saved are highly unlikely to have occurred by chance. The influences tested are, in the
following order: winner (DSO or contractor); contract size (‘small’ or ‘large’); service
(domestic or catering); and service type (single or mixed).
There is an a priori expectation that cost savings would be larger if contractors
win the contract. DSOs were the incumbent in all cases. Contractors not merely had to
match the DSO bid but, in the period under study, had to shade it sufficiently to offset
the “below the line” redundancy and other severance costs from the DSO losing the
contract. On average, the costs were 12% of the annual price of the contract in the15
evaluations for domestic only contacts. The corresponding proportion for mixed
domestic contracts was lower at 6%.
In two of the three pairs of comparisons contractors did indeed reduce costs
more than did DSOs, with corresponding mean values around 29% and 13%,
respectively. In England contractors were also found to have made greater reductions
than DSOs for domestic and catering contracts, particularly in the initial period when
compulsory competitive tendering was implemented (NAO, 1987, paras. 2.29 and
2.32).
The impact of contract size was tested by dividing the contracts into two
groups: ‘small’ for contracts whose previous cost was less than £0.6m in current
prices; and ‘large’ for contracts whose value was greater. We have no a priori view as
to which group would experience larger cost savings. Five pairs of comparisons are
possible, but in no case are the cost reductions significantly different between ‘small’
and ‘large’ contracts.
We have already indicated that English experience suggests the cost savings
would be greater for domestic than catering services. Five pairs of comparisons are
possible using the Scottish data, but only one confirmed this experience using the
second approach. The exception is large single service contracts retained by DSOs,
whose mean values were 22.3% and 13.5% for domestic and catering services,
respectively.
The final characteristic is service type, single versus mixed service contracts.
The limited evidence above suggests the cost savings for catering was less than for
domestic services. If the difference were sufficiently large this would impact on the
single versus mixed differential. It does so for one of the four possible comparisons,
being large domestic contracts retained by DSOs. The savings are greater, as expected,16
for the single as against mixed service contracts, with mean values of 22.3% and
12.0%, respectively.
4. Discussion
This paper has largely been concerned with establishing whether competitive
tendering was effectively compulsory in the Scottish NHS. The NHS stands apart from
parallel policies in central and local government. In central government, ministers
could exercise direct control. In local government statutory measures were introduced
with central government monitoring to ensure compliance. The Conservative
Government chose a more light handed approach in the case of the NHS, and left
responsibility for implementation to the various health boards. The result was the
policy was all but ignored at first in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.
The situation in Scotland changed dramatically in 1987. A transformation was
achieved within a few months and the English experience, at least for two of the three
services, was subsequently more than matched. Much of the credit must surely go to
Michael Forsyth. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher recognised a kindred spirit, and
took a close interest in him.  His subsequent career might be described as the ‘rise and
rise of Michael Forsyth MP’. Within a short period - by September 1990 - Forsyth was
promoted to become a Minister of State at the Scottish Office.  After a period in office
down South, he was further promoted, by John Major, in July 1995 to become
Secretary of State at the Scottish Office.  There he remained until the Conservative
Government lost the 1997 general election.
Even talented politicians, nevertheless, need opportunity, and this was available
at the right time for Forsyth. Market testing requires contractors, and contractors
prefer ‘willing partners’. The description ‘willing partner’ hardly applied to the17
Scottish health boards, and so contractors concentrated on the English market.
However, by 1987 new markets had to be found if their business were to expand.
Scotland promised to make a significant addition. Contract cleaners were willing to do
business. Unusually, for that time, so also was a major contract caterer, already based
in Scotland. Its established business had been to serve North Sea oil and gas
exploration companies. However, its established business was in decline and NHS
catering offered the opportunity to make good. All three catering contracts that were
won by contractors were won by this one.
5. Postscript
So far we have written about the period up to 1991, and the ability of a
national government to export unpopular policies to devolved administrations.  There
have been important developments since then, but the principle of putting NHS non-
clinical support services out to competitive tender, now described as ‘market testing’,
has not been abandoned.  In chronological terms, the following significant events merit
a mention.
First, was the publication in November 1991 of the White Paper Competing for
Quality (H M Treasury, 1991).  Not only was the principle of market testing extended
to other support services, but quite significantly there was a shift in the emphasis of its
purpose.  As the title of the White Paper suggests, and as its text details:
“Competition does not mean invariably choosing the cheapest
service: it means finding the best combination of quality and price which
reflects the priority of the service.” (Ibid, p 1)
Second, was the creation of NHS trusts to facilitate the introduction of the
internal market.  The first Scottish trusts were formed in April 1992 and the last in18
April 1995.  By then the process was virtually complete, and only the three Islands
Health Boards have directly managed units. The trusts took over the health boards’
responsibility for implementing the policy of market testing hospital support services.
In terms of the use of management resources the policy must have had a low priority
during this period of re-organisation.
Third, was the realisation around 1993 that the European Community’s Acquired
Rights directive might apply to the market testing of publicly funded services.  The
directive is designed to protect workers’ pay and conditions of service on their transfer
from one employer to another.  Two consequences of significance are identified.  First,
the rationale of ‘below the line’ severance costs in the evaluation of tenders, should
DSOs lose to contractors, has disappeared.  It is now be easier for contractors to win,
and they would be more willing to tender. DSOs, wishing to retain contracts, now
have to be more cost effective.  Second, and at least temporarily, the directive created
great uncertainty.  The following quote from the Scottish Office guidance issued in
October 1993 gives  an indication of its flavour: surely sufficiently strong to deter all
but the most determined participants from tendering.
“… it should be clearly understood that the guidance therein gives the
current position of TUPE [the UK legislation relating to the directive] and
is subject to amendment depending on the Court decisions both in the UK
and the European Court of Justice.  The NHS Management Executive in
Scotland will not be responsible for any damages claimed by contractors
or Health Boards following decisions taken as a result of this guidance.”
(Scottish Office, 1993, Annex G para 1, emphasis in the original).
The final significant event was the Scottish Office guidance issued in April
1998 (Scottish Office, 1998).  Two points are worth identifying.  First, staff pay and
conditions of service now have some protection when seeking value for money in the
management of support services.  And second, market testing was the method of19
securing improvements in quality and value only after other routes, usually comprising
partnerships of some form, had been tried.
In conclusion, the ground rules for competitive tendering of NHS non-clinical
support services have changed since the policy was introduced in 1983 in Scotland by
a Conservative government.  However, the principle of competitive tendering, to
secure quality and value for money, remains under New Labour.20
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Table 1
Expenditure on hotel services, by service and health board, financial year 1984-85 (£ 1,000s)
Health board Cleaning Catering Laundry All services
Argyll and Clyde 3,937 4,423 1,319 9,679
Ayrshire and Arran 2,708 3,740 868 7,316
Borders 808 1,016 250 2,074
Dumfries and Galloway 1,403 1,905 382 3,690
Fife 2,631 3,270 876 6,777
Forth Valley 2,491 3,547 869 6,907
Grampian 5,128 5,708 1,305 12,141
Greater Glasgow 12,344 16,043 4,112 32,499
Highland 1,886 1,877 520 4,283
Lanarkshire 4,456 5,333 1,276 11,065
Lothian 7,974 9,382 2,172 19,528
Orkney 191 177 79 447
Shetland 172 216 90 478
Tayside 5,262 6,534 1,743 13,539
Western Isles 240 394 150 784
All health boards 51,631 63,565 16,011 131,207
Source: Hansard 25 November 1985, written answer, col. 424.23
Table 2
Hospital coverage, end March 1991, select features
Feature Domestic Catering
Number of contracts 84 76
Number of hospitals 187 184
Proportion of hospitals (%) 68 67
Average number of staffed beds 44,285 42,725
Proportion of staffed beds (%) 85 8224
Table 3
Distribution of contracts by size and service
Size (£m) Domestic only Catering only Domestic mixed
Less than 0.5 16 12 9
0.5, less than 1.0 27 19 5
1.0, less than 1.5 7 10 6
1.5 and over 3 5 5
Missing values 6 9 0
All sizes 59 55 2525
Table 4
Distribution on costs saved, by service (%)
Costs saved (%) Domestic only Catering only Domestic mixed
Less than 0.0 2 1 0
0.0, less than 10 11 16 8
10, less than 20 14 16 14
20, less than 30 10 10 2
30 and over 16 3 1
Missing values 6 9* 0
All values 59 55* 25
Note: * No award was made in the case of one contract
Source: Scottish Office Department of Health
.26
Figure 1 Extent of coverage, England by RHA 





























1. The four Thames RHAs
2. East Anglia, Oxford and Wessex RHAs
3. South Western, Trent and West Midlands RHAs
4. Merseyside, North Western and Yorkshire RHAs
5. Northern RHA
6. The Regional Health Authority values are calculated on the basis of giving each constituent
district health authority equal weight, irrespective of size of district. The district health
authority data were obtained from Hansard, 25 November 1986, written answer, cols 213-
20. The group data are the average of the individual Regional Health Authority values.
Source: Hansard, 25 November 1986, written answer, cols. 213-20.27
Appendix 1
Analysis of Costs Saved
Pairs of mean values of the various characteristics, given in the table A1 below, are
compared on a pairwise basis. For example, the characteristic ‘winner’ is tested by comparing
the three pairs where the only difference is ‘winner’, being in this case: small/domestic/single,
large/domestic/single and large/catering/single. The comparisons follow standard procedures, a
description of which may be found in Woodward and Francis (1988), section 7.9.
The characteristics are assumed to have their own population variances, and the
different hypotheses are tested on the basis of a 95% confidence interval. For example, the
characteristic ‘winner’ may be tested for small/domestic/single contracts, whose mean values
are 13.5% for DSOs and 30.4% for contractors. The difference in means is therefore 16.9%.
The standard deviation is 7.1%. The degrees of freedom for the two small samples is 10.9,
giving a Student’s t-ratio of 2.201 for a two-tail test, and 1.796 for a one-tail test at the 95%
confidence interval. In the case of ‘winner’ we hypothesise cost savings will be greater for
contractors, so a one-tail test could be used. The 95% confidence interval is 16.9% +/-
7.1%*1.796, which lies between 4.1% and 30.0%. This range does not contain zero, and so
contractors did indeed reduce costs more for this sub-set. In fact the more stringent two-tail test
would also have shown contractors reduced costs more.28
Table A1
Summary descriptive statistics of costs saved by contract sub-set
Contract sub-set Mean Sample size Standard
deviation
Winner/size/service/service type (%) (%)
01 DSO/small/domestic/single 13.5 20 18.6
02 DSO/large/domestic/single 22.3 19 11.9
03 DSO/small/catering/single 14.5 19 12.8
04 DSO/large/catering/single 12.0 24 8.2
05 DSO/small/domestic/mixed 13.9 13 10.5
06 DSO/large/domestic/mixed 13.5 12 5.8
07 DSO/small/catering/mixed 14.6 11 11.3
08 DSO/large/catering/mixed 12.3 10 5.0
09 Contractor/small/domestic/single 30.4 6 14.0
10 Contractor/large/domestic/single 27.5 8 14.3
11 Contractor/large/catering/single 27.4 3 8.4
Notes
• Table based on samples of 84 domestic contracts whose pre-tender value is known in 78
cases, and 76 catering contracts whose pre-tender value is known in 67 cases. ‘Small’
contracts have a pre-tender value of £0.6m in current prices, ‘large’ contracts have a higher
value.
 
• Contracts are found in all eight sub-sets for those won by DSOs, but only for three of the
sub-sets for those won by contractors. Contractors won none of the mixed service contracts.29
The results of the pairwise comparison are given in table A2 below. Given eleven different
sub-sets, there are 55 possible comparisons, but only 17 are of interest: they are identified in
the table. Three test for the importance of winner, five each for size and service, and four for
service type. The variation in costs saved is so great, given the sample size in each sub-set, that
in only four cases are the differences unlikely to have come about by chance. They are
indicated by upper case letters.
Table A2




04 …. SERV size
05 type …. …. ….
06 …. TYPE …. …. Size
07 …. …. type …. Serv ….
08 … …. …. type …. Serv size
09 WIN …. …. …. …. …. …. ….
10 …. win …. …. …. …. …. …. size
11 …. …. …. WIN*. …. …. … …. …. serv
Sub-set 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Notation:




TYPE = service type.
Upper cases denote means different at the 95% confidence interval using the two-tail test.
Suffix * denotes means different using a one-tail test